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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JAMES WALLBERG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20061024-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
is J: ic 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals his convictions on one count of driving under the influence, a 
third degree felony, one count of driving on a suspended or revoked license, a Class B 
misdemeanor, one count of driving without evidence of security, a Class B misdemeanor, 
one count of driving without registration, a Class C misdemeanor, and one count of 
speeding, a Class C misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Was the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions, where 
defendant was driving 11 miles per hour over the speed limit on a revoked driver's 
license, his registration had expired, he had no proof of insurance, he failed the only field 
sobriety test that he took, and where a subsequent blood draw showed that his blood 
alcohol level was above the legal limit at the time of the stop? 
Standard of Review: On appeal from a jury verdict, this Court "review[s] the 
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict." 
State v. Greene, 2006 UT App 445, f 7, 147 P.3d 957 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). This Court "reverse[s] a jury verdict only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he 
or she was convicted." Id, 
Issue 2: Has defendant demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel, where he alleges that his trial counsel failed to call two unidentified witnesses to 
offer unspecified testimony regarding his case? 
Standard of Review: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 
162. To demonstrate ineffectiveness, "defendant must show: (1) that counsel's 
performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for 
the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial." 
Id. (citing Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). "Failure to satisfy either 
prong will result in our concluding that counsel's behavior was not ineffective." State v. 
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, % 38, 55 P.3d 1131. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Defendant was convicted of violating the following statutes, which are each 
reprinted in the Addendum. 
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• Utah Code Annotated § 41-la-1303(l) (West 2004) (Driving Without 
Registration) 
• Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502 (West 2004) (Driving Under the Influence) 
• Utah Code Annotated § 41 -6a-601 (West 2004) (Speeding) 
• Utah Code Annotated § 41-12a-303.2 (West 2004) (Security) 
• Utah Code Annotated § 53-3-227(3)(a) (West 2004) (Revoked License) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was originally charged with: (1) one count of driving under the 
influence; (2) one count of driving on a suspended or revoked license; (3) one count of 
driving without registration; (4) one count of speeding; (5) one count of driving without 
evidence of security; and (6) one count of unlawful possession of a prescription drug. R. 
14-17. Defendant was tried on August 23, 2006. R. 247. Following the presentation of 
the evidence, the prosecution voluntarily dismissed the prescription drug charge. R. 247: 
153. The jury convicted defendant of the remaining charges. R. 247: 179-80. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
At approximately 3:26 p.m. on June 28, 2005, R. 247: 102, Officer John Crowley 
pulled defendant over for driving 41 miles per hour in a 30 miles per hour zone outside of 
Duchesne. R. 247: 51-52, 53-54. Defendant was not looking at his speedometer and 
therefore could not deny that he was speeding. R. 247: 131. Instead, defendant claimed 
that he was simply driving with the flow of traffic. R. 247: 131. 
When Officer Crowley asked defendant for identification, defendant handed him a 
California government ID and a social security card. R. 247: 55. Officer Crowley 
]
"In setting out the facts from the record on appeal.. . all conflicts and doubts" are 
resolved "in favor of the jury's verdict and the rulings of the trial court." State v. 
Yanez 2002 UT App 50, \ 1 n.l, 42 P.3d 1248 (citation omitted). 
3 
checked with dispatch and learned that defendant's Utah driver's license had been 
revoked for an alcohol-related conviction. R. 247: 55-58; 143-44. 
Officer Crowley asked defendant to provide proof of insurance. Defendant had 
"no documentation at all" and "nothing in the vehicle to show that he had insurance." R. 
247: 57. Defendant later admitted that he did not have proof of insurance from an 
insurance company. R. 247: 141-42. Officer Crowley also asked defendant to provide 
proof that the truck was registered. R. 247: 56. Defendant did not have any proof of 
registration, but instead pointed to a temporary registration tag in the back of his vehicle. 
R. 247: 56. The temporary registration tag was expired. R. 247: 56. 
Officer Crowley detected a "strong odor of an alcoholic beverage." R. 247: 86. 
Officer Crowley could smell alcohol on both defendant's breath and from the interior of 
defendant's truck. R. 247: 66, 106 (breath); 56 (truck). The officer noticed an 18-pack of 
beer on the passenger seat that was missing eight beers. R. 247: 55, 58-60. When 
Officer Crowley asked defendant where he had bought the beer, defendant told him that 
he had bought it earlier that day in Thermopolis, Wyoming, which was approximately 6 
to 8 hours away. R. 247: 59. Although the beer was not in a cooler, it was still cold. R. 
247: 59-60. Defendant initially stated that he had had nothing to drink that day. R. 247: 
59. Upon further questioning, defendant admitted that he had had "a few beers that 
morning." R. 247: 59. 
Defendant's speech was "a little bit slurred" and his eyes were "glossy and red." 
R. 247: 66. Defendant had slight balance problems and "was kind of using the side of the 
truck to balance, leaning against things, that type of stuff." R. 247: 67. Defendant was 
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moody and somewhat agitated, and was "rude" and "argumentative" to Officer Crowley. 
R. 247: 66-68. Officer Crowley believed that defendant was incapable of operating a 
motor vehicle safely. R. 24: 67-68. 
Defendant agreed to perform a horizontal gaze nystagmus test (HGN) to measure 
his sobriety. R. 247: 61. Defendant failed the HGN test. R. 247: 61-62. Officer 
Crowley then asked defendant to perform other field sobriety tests, but defendant 
"refused all tests" and insisted that such tests would be "inadmissible as evidence" 
against him. R. 247: 62. 
Defendant also refused to take a breathalyzer test. R. 247: 63. As a result, Officer 
Crowley obtained a warrant to take a blood sample from defendant to measure his blood 
alcohol content (BAC). R. 4. Officer Crowley transported defendant to the Uintah Basin 
Medical Center in Roosevelt, which was approximately 30 miles away. R. 247: 65. 
Officer Crowley's contemporaneous police report indicates that defendant's blood was 
drawn at 7:20 pm. R. 247: 65. The State measured four samples of defendant's blood. 
R. 247: 115-16. The BAC of the four samples was .07, .069, .071. and .07. R. 247: 116. 
Under standard protocol, a suspect's BAC is determined using the lowest of the four 
samples. R. 247: 115-16. 
The State presented two blood alcohol experts at defendant's trial. Both experts 
testified that, even when accounting for such variables as the quantity of food in the 
stomach, the blood alcohol absorption/burn-off rate for an average person is .015 to .018 
per hour. R. 247: 117, 121-22. Given the approximate four-hour gap between the traffic 
stop and the blood draw in this case, both experts concluded that defendant's BAC was 
5 
over the legal limit of .08 at the time of the stop. R. 247: 117; 122-24. Defendant did not 
call an expert witness to rebut these claims. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his 
convictions. Defendant was observed driving 11 miles per hour over the speed limit on a 
revoked driver's license, and he did not have valid registration or insurance. Defendant 
failed the only field sobriety test that he took, and a subsequent blood draw showed that 
defendant's blood alcohol level was above the legal limit at the time of the stop. Given 
this, defendant's convictions were supported by more than sufficient evidence. 
Defendant next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling the 
doctor who drew his blood at the hospital, as well as for not calling an expert to testify 
regarding his blood alcohol levels. Defendant has not identified either witness nor 
demonstrated that either witness would have actually supported his defense. In addition, 
the record suggests that the decision to not call an expert witness was a deliberate, tactical 
decision. Defendant's ineffective assistance claims should be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF ALL FIVE 
CHARGES 
A. The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's five convictions. 
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support each of his 
five convictions. Aplt. Br. 10-12. As explained below, the evidence was more than 
sufficient to support all of defendant's convictions. 
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When reviewing a sufficiency challenge to a jury verdict, the appellate court 
"determine[s] only whether sufficient competent evidence was admitted to satisfy each 
element of the charge [and] whether sufficient evidence was before the jury to enable it to 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." State v. 
Horde, 2002 UT 4, \ 44, 57 P.3d 977. Appellate courts "do not re-evaluate the credibility 
of witnesses or second-guess the jury's conclusion." Id. Instead, jury verdicts are only 
reversed "'if the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime.5" State v. Nelson, 2007 UT App 34, If 8, 157 P.3d 329 (emphasis in original) 
(citation omitted). 
"[A]s a general rule, in reviewing a jury verdict we assume that the jury believed 
the evidence supporting the verdict." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343-44 (Utah 1997). 
Thus, the "'existence of contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences does not 
warrant disturbing the jury's verdict.'" State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, \ 11, 54 P.3d 
645 (citation omitted). 
Speeding 
Defendant was convicted of violating Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-601 (West 
2004). Officer John Crowley clocked defendant driving 41 miles per hour in a 30 miles 
per hour zone. R. 247: 51, 53-54. Officer Crowley is a certified instructor in radar 
operation and had calibrated his radar gun to ensure that it was working properly. R. 247: 
52-53. Defendant later admitted that he was not looking at his speedometer and could not 
testify regarding his exact speed. R. 247: 131. The evidence therefore satisfied the 
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elements of this charge, and defendant's speeding conviction was proper. Honie, 2002 
UT 4,^44. 
Given this, this Court should also reject defendant's claim that there was "no 
legitimate ground to have pulled him over in the first place." Aplt. Br. 10. It is well-
accepted that a "police officer may legally stop a vehicle incident to a traffic offense." 
State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1992). Defendant's claim that he was 
simply "driving with the flow of traffic," Aplt. Br. 11, is immaterial. Section 41-6a-601 
does not provide a "flow of traffic" defense to speeding, and defendant has not pointed to 
any legal authority suggesting that such a defense exists. 
Revoked License 
Defendant was convicted of violating Utah Code Annotated § 53-3-227(3)(a) 
(West 2004). Under section 53-3-227(3)(a), it is illegal to "drive[ ] any motor vehicle 
upon the highways of this state" while the person's driver's license has been revoked for 
failing to submit to a blood alcohol test. 
At trial, the State provided a certified copy of defendant's Utah's driving record, 
which showed that defendant's license was revoked on August 27, 2003, due to 
defendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer during a DUI investigation. R. 247: 57-58, 
143-44. This evidence satisfied the elements of this charge. See Honie, 2002 UT 4, ^ 44. 
Registration 
Defendant was convicted of violating Utah Code Annotated § 41-la-1303(l) 
(West 2004). Under section 41-la-1303(l)(a)(i), it is illegal to drive a vehicle that "is 
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not properly registered or for which a certificate of title has not been issued or applied 
for." 
Officer Crowley asked defendant to provide proof that the truck was registered. 
R. 247: 56. Defendant did not have any proof of registration, but instead pointed to a 
temporary registration tag in the back of his vehicle. R. 247: 56. The temporary 
registration tag was expired. R. 247: 56. 
In spite of this, defendant claims that this conviction was invalid because "[i]t is 
highly likely that the state records division had not yet recorded" his application for 
registration. Aplt. Br. 11. Although defendant's trial occurred over a year after the stop, 
he offered no proof to support this speculative claim. Regardless, the "'existence of 
contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences does not warrant disturbing the jury's 
verdict.'5' Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, ^ f 11. This conviction should therefore be affirmed. 
Security 
Defendant was convicted of violating Utah Code Annotated § 41-12a-
303.2(2)(a)(i) (West 2004), which states that a "person operating a motor vehicle shall: 
(A) have in the person's immediate possession evidence of owner's or operator's security 
for the motor vehicle the person is operating; and (B) display it upon demand of a peace 
officer." 
Defendant has admitted that he did not have proof of insurance from an insurance 
company, R. 247: 141-42, but nevertheless claims that he complied with this statute by 
providing documentation from the truck dealership showing that he had purchased 
insurance when he purchased the truck. R. 247: 141-42. Officer Crowley disputed this, 
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however, testifying that defendant had "no documentation at all" and that defendant had 
"nothing in the vehicle to show that he had insurance." R. 247: 57. "[A]s a general rule, 
in reviewing a jury verdict we assume that the jury believed the evidence supporting the 
verdict." Brown, 948 P.2d at 343-44. The "'existence of contradictory evidence or of 
conflicting inferences does not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict,'" and this conviction 
should therefore be affirmed. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,111. 
Driving Under the Influence 
Defendant was convicted of violating Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502(l) (West 
2004), which makes it illegal for a person to drive while the person "(b) is under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or (c) has a blood 
or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation or actual 
physical control." Defendant argues that: (1) there was no basis for Officer Crowley to 
conduct a DUI investigation; and (2) that the evidence was not sufficient to support the 
DUI conviction.2 
First, Officer Crowley had proper justification for his DUI investigation. In State 
v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 581 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, the Utah Supreme Court recently held 
that an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation where the officer 
Defendant argues that Officer Crowley did not have a basis to either (1) question 
him regarding possible impairment or (2) ask him to perform the HGN test. Aplt. Br. 11-
12. As discussed above, Officer Crowley also obtained a blood sample from defendant 
pursuant to a warrant. Defendant has not cited any rules or cases regarding the issuance 
of a blood draw warrant, nor has defendant specifically challenged this warrant in his 
brief. The State therefore does not address either the validity of the warrant or the 
admissibility of the resultant BAC evidence. 
10 
had seen a "large water spot on the road, a crushed beer can, [and] a cooler," and where 
the officer had "smelled alcohol on [the suspect's] breath." Id. at f 26. In State v. 
Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, 157 P.3d 826, this Court similarly held that an officer had 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation during a valid traffic stop where the 
officer observed the suspect's "dilated pupils, nervous demeanor, and jerky body 
movements." Id at ^ 8. 
In this case, Officer Crowley pulled defendant over because defendant was 
speeding. In the course of that stop, Officer Crowley detected a "strong odor of an 
alcoholic beverage," R. 247: 86, and smelled alcohol on both defendant's breath and 
coming from the interior of defendant's truck. R. 247: 66, 106 (breath); 56 (vehicle). 
Officer Crowley observed a still-cold 18-pack of beer on the passenger seat of 
defendant's vehicle that was missing eight beers. R. 247: 55, 58, 59-60. Defendant's 
speech was "a little bit slurred," and his eyes were "glossy and red." R. 247: 66. 
Defendant had slight balance problems and "was kind of using the side of the truck to 
balance, leaning against things, that type of stuff." R. 247: 67. Defendant was moody 
and agitated, and was "rude" and "argumentative" to Officer Crowley. R. 247: 66-68. 
Defendant also gave conflicting stories regarding his consumption of alcohol that day. R. 
247: 59. This evidence clearly gave rise to reasonable suspicion of impairment, and 
Officer Crowley's decision to question defendant and conduct field sobriety tests was 
therefore constitutionally justified. See Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, ^ 9; Layton City v. 
Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah App. 1987). 
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Second, the evidence supported the jury's conclusion that defendant was driving 
while under the influence. As a threshold matter, section 41 -6a-502(l) does not require a 
BAC above .08 to sustain a DUI conviction. Instead, a jury may simply conclude that the 
driver was "under the influence of alcohol... to a degree that render[ed] the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle." In this case, defendant's speech was "a little bit 
slurred" and his eyes were "glossy and red." R. 247: 66. Defendant had slight balance 
problems and "was kind of using the side of the truck to balance, leaning against things, 
that type of stuff." R. 247: 67. Defendant was moody and somewhat agitated. R. 247: 
67. Defendant was "rude" and "argumentative" to Officer Crowley. R. 247: 66, 68. 
Based on the "totality" of defendant's behavior, Officer Crowley concluded that 
defendant was incapable of operating a motor vehicle safely. R. 24: 67-68. 
When reviewing a jury verdict, this Court "assume[s] that the jury believed the 
evidence supporting the verdict," Brown, 948 P.2d at 343-44, and refrains from "re-
evaluat[ing] the credibility of witnesses or second-guess[ing] the jury's conclusion." 
Honie, 2002 UT 4, ^ 44. This Court should assume that the jury accepted Officer 
Crowley's conclusion regarding defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle safely and 
therefore affirm the DUI conviction on this basis alone. 
In any event, the evidence was also sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that 
defendant had a BAC above the legal limit at the time of the stop. The State presented 
testimony from two experts who analyzed defendant's blood sample and concluded that 
defendant's BAC exceeded the legal limit at the time of the stop. R. 247: 117; 122-24. 
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Although defendant did not present any contrary expert testimony, he nevertheless 
challenges the conclusions of these two experts by claiming that they did not account for 
what he had eaten, his weight, or his height. Aplt. Br. 12. Appellate courts "do not re-
evaluate the credibility of witnesses," however, "or second-guess the jury's conclusion." 
Honie, 2002 UT 4, ^ 44. If defendant "wishe[d] to discredit the testimony [of the expert 
witnesses], or if he wishe[d] the jury to give little weight to it—two notions that are 
separate issues from the admissibility of the testimony—he [was], of course, welcome to 
invite an expert witness of his own to contradict" those witnesses. Depew v. Sullian, 
2003 UT App 152, % 42, 71 P.3d 601 (emphasis in original). "[T]he mere fact that 
[defendant] does not agree with the [experts'] methods" does not affect that admissibility 
of their testimony. Id. The jury was entitled to accept these experts' conclusions, and 
defendant's DUT conviction should therefore be affirmed. 
B. Defendant has not demonstrated that his counsel was ineffective, nor has he 
demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the alleged errors. 
Defendant also contends that his counsel was ineffective for not calling the doctor 
who drew his blood or a blood alcohol expert. To demonstrate ineffectiveness, 
"defendant must show: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) 
a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have 
obtained a more favorable outcome at trial." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,^ f 6, 89 P.3d 162 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). "Failure to satisfy either 
prong will result in our concluding that counsel's behavior was not ineffective." State v. 
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, ^  38, 55 P.3d 1131. As set forth below, defendant has failed to 
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establish either deficient performance or prejudice, and his claim should therefore be 
rejected. 
First, defendant has not demonstrated that his counsel's performance was 
objectively deficient. Parties claiming ineffective assistance have the duty and 
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record. State v. Wetzel, 868 
P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). "When a defendant raises an ineffective assistance claim for the 
first time on appeal, the claim will be reviewed only 'if the ... record is adequate to permit 
decision of the issue.5" State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) (citation 
omitted). "If a defendant is aware of any nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully 
appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that 
counsel was ineffective, defendant bears the primary obligation and burden of moving for 
a temporary remand" under Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. State v. 
Person, 2006 UT App 288, % 12, 140 P.3d 584. Where the record appears inadequate in 
any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies in the record are construed in favor of a finding 
that counsel performed effectively. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 17, 12 P.3d 92. 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel should have called the doctor who drew his 
blood at the hospital to testify "about an independent HGN test done at the hospital, the 
exact time of the blood draw and the rate of alcohol absorption." Aplt. Br. 12. 
Defendant does provide any details regarding this second HGN test, such as when it was 
taken or what the results were. Defendant does not indicate what he thinks the "exact 
3
 Defendant's ineffectiveness claim is only related to his DUI charge and does not 
affect the validity of his other four convictions. 
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time of the blood draw" actually was, nor does he explain how such testimony would 
have impacted the jury's deliberations. Defendant does not identify the doctor, nor does 
he provide any evidence regarding this unnamed doctor's qualifications to discuss the 
"rate of alcohol absorption." Most importantly, defendant does not provide any specific 
basis for concluding that this doctor would have contradicted the State's experts. At 
most, defendant has simply speculated that this unnamed doctor might have said 
something that might have impacted this case in some undefined way. 
Defendant's claim regarding a possible blood alcohol expert is similarly lacking. 
Defendant has not identified any expert whom he thinks should have been called, nor has 
he demonstrated how such an expert would have reached different conclusions regarding 
his BAC. Instead, defendant has simply speculated that some hypothetical expert might 
have offered some testimony that might have impacted this case in some undefined way.4 
"[Pjroof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter," but 
must instead "be a demonstrable reality." Penman, 964 P.2d at 1162. In State v. 
Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, 57 P.3d 1139, this Court rejected a claim like defendant's 
based on Bradley's failure to "offer any evidence about who these potential witnesses are 
or what their testimony would entail." Id. at |^j 65. This Court accordingly held that "the 
record [was] inadequate to enable us to consider this claim." Id. Defendant's claim is 
4
 It is worth noting that the blood alcohol question in this case was not close. The 
State's two experts both testified that the blood alcohol absorption/burn-off rate for an 
average person is between .015 to .018 per hour. R. 247: 117, 121-22. Defendant's 
blood was drawn at 7:20 p.m., approximately four hours after the traffic stop. Assuming 
a .015/hour burn-off, defendant's BAC was .129 at the time of the stop, a full .049 above 
the legal limit. Assuming a .018/hour burn-off, defendant's BAC was .141, which was 
.061 above the legal limit. 
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similarly unsupported by the record, and this Court should therefore refuse to speculate 
that his counsel acted deficiently by failing to call two unidentified witnesses to offer 
undefined testimony. 
Defendant's claim relating to the proposed blood alcohol witness should also be 
rejected for an additional reason. "In claiming ineffectiveness of counsel, defendant must 
. . . overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance and 
exercised reasonable professional judgment." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 
(Utah 1989). "If a rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated, we will 
assume counsel acted competently. Indeed, authority from this court supports the notion 
that an ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic 
or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." Id. Decisions regarding "'what 
witnesses to call, what objections to make, and, by and large, what defenses to interpose" 
are considered "tactical decisions" and are therefore "left to the professional judgment of 
counsel.'" State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, % 38, 579 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (citation 
omitted). 
Two months before trial, defendant's counsel submitted an expert witness list that 
identified Dennis Croon as his expert. R. 117. At the outset of the trial, however, 
defendant's counsel informed the court that defendant would be the defense's only 
witness. R. 247: 5. Defense counsel then made no mention of an expert at any time 
during the trial. The record suggests that this was not an inadvertent oversight. In two 
separate letters that defendant wrote to the trial court following his convictions, he 
referred to his trial counsel's active inability to locate a suitable expert. R. 162 ("I asked 
16 
him why there wasn't expert witness in my behalf he just said he couldn't find any"); R. 
191 (referring to his trial counsel's "problem of getting expert witnesses in my defense"). 
The clear implication of this is that defense counsel actively tried to find an expert, but 
could not find one who would support defendant's position. Rather than calling a 
potentially hostile expert, defense counsel instead chose to attack the credibility and 
conclusions of the State's experts on cross-examination. This was a legitimate, albeit 
ultimately unsuccessful, trial strategy. This Court should therefore deny this claim. 
Second, defendant's ineffective assistance claim should also be rejected because 
he has failed to demonstrate prejudice. As explained above, defendant has not provided 
this Court with any basis to conclude that either witness would have helped his case in 
any way. Defendant has not pointed to anything in the record showing prejudice, nor has 
he requested a remand under Rule 23B to create such a record for purposes of this 
appeal. At most, defendant has simply speculated that these two unidentified witnesses 
might have put the State's extrapolation theory to some undefined "scrutiny by the jury." 
Aplt. Br. 14. This speculative, unsupported suggestion does not create a reasonable 
probability that defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. Clark, 
2004 UT 25, \ 6. Defendant's ineffective assistance claim should accordingly be 
rejected. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted August k , 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RYAND.TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum 
Vfetlaw 
UT ST § 41-la-1303 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-la-1303 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
*1 Chapter 1A. Motor Vehicle Act 
*i Part 13. Offenses and Penalties 
-•§ 41-la-1303. Driving without registration or certificate of title—Class B 
or C misdemeanor 
(1)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2) or Section 41-la-211, a person may 
not drive or move, or an owner may not knowingly permit to be driven or moved upon 
any highway any vehicle of a type required to be registered in this state: 
(i) that is not properly registered or for which a certificate of title has not 
been issued or applied for; or 
(ii) for which the required fee has not been paid. 
(b) A violation of this Subsection (1) is a class C misdemeanor. 
(2)(a) A violation of Subsection 41-la-202(3), related to registration of vehicles 
after establishing residency, is a class B misdemeanor and except as provided in 
Subsection (2)(b), has a minimum fine of $1000. 
(b) A court may not dismiss an action brought for a violation of Subsection 41-
la-202(3) merely because the defendant has obtained the appropriate registration 
subsequent to violating the section. The court may, however, reduce the fine to 
$200 if the violator presents evidence at the time of his hearing that: 
(i) the vehicle is currently registered properly; and 
(ii) the violation has not existed for more than one year. 
(3) A court may require proof of proper motor vehicle registration as part of any 
sentence imposed under this section. 
Laws 1935, c. 46, § 18; Laws 1937, c. 65, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 274, § 5; Laws 
1991, c. 241, § 39; Laws 1992, c. 1, § 160; Laws 1994, c. 97, § 2; Laws 1995, 
c. 86, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 269, § 2, eff. March 19, 1997; Laws 
2002, c. 56, § 1, eff. May 6, 2002. 
Codifications C. 1943, § 57-3a-18; C. 1953, § 41-1-18. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2002, c. 56, substantially rewrote this section that formerly provided: 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 4 1 - 6 a - 5 0 2 
Westfs Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
*i Chapter 6A. Traffic Code (Refs & Annos) 
*! Part 5. Driving Under The Influence and Reckless Driving (Refs & Annos) 
-+§ 41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a 
combination of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration 
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within 
this state if the person: 
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person1s body that a subsequent chemical test 
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater at the time of the test; 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle; or 
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the 
time of operation or actual physical control. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 
100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based 
upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance 
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510. 
Laws 2005, c. 2, § 58, eff. Feb. 2, 2005; Laws 2005, c. 91, § 1, eff. July 1 
2005. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Prior Laws: 
Laws 1941, c. 52, § 34. 
Laws 1949, c. 65, § 1. 
Laws 1957, c. 75, § 1. 
Laws 1967, c. 88, § 2. 
Laws 1969, c. 107, § 2. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 41-6a-601 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Ri Chapter 6A. Traffic Code (Refs & Annos) 
*! Part 6. Speed Restrictions 
-•§ 41-6a-601. Speed regulations—Safe and appropriate speeds at certain 
locations—Prima facie speed limits—Emergency power of the governor 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and potential 
hazards then existing, including when: 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and 
(e) approaching other hazards that exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, 
weather, or highway conditions. 
(2) Subject to Subsections (1) and (4) and Sections 41-6a-602 and 41-6a-603, the 
following speeds are lawful: 
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school zone as defined in Section 
41-6a-303; 
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district; and 
(c) 55 miles per hour in other locations. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6a-604, any speed in excess of the limits 
provided in this section or established under Sections 41-6a-602 and 41-6a-603 is 
prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is 
unlawful. 
(4) The governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change the speed 
limits on the highways of the state. 
Laws 2005, c. 2, § 85, eff. Feb. 2, 2005. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Prior Laws: 
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UT ST § 41-12a-303.2 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-12a-303.2 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
*I Chapter 12A. Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators 
Act 
*ii Part III. Owner's or Operator's Security Requirement 
-•§ 41-12a-303.2. Evidence of owner's or operator's security to be carried 
when operating motor vehicle—Defense—Penalties 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Division" means the Motor Vehicle Division of the State Tax Commission. 
(b) "Registration materials" means the evidences of motor vehicle registration, 
including all registration cards, license plates, temporary permits, and 
nonresident temporary permits. 
(2)(a)(i) A person operating a motor vehicle shall: 
(A) have in the person's immediate possession evidence of owner's or 
operator's security for the motor vehicle the person is operating; and 
(B) display it upon demand of a peace officer. 
(ii) A person is exempt from the requirements of Subsection (2)(a)(i) if the 
person is operating: 
(A) a government-owned or leased motor vehicle; or 
(B) an employer-owned or leased motor vehicle and is driving it with the 
employer's permission. 
(b) Evidence of owner's or operator's security includes any one of the following: 
(i) a copy of the operator's valid: 
(A) insurance policy; 
(B) insurance policy declaration page; 
(C) binder notice; 
(D) renewal notice; or 
(E) card issued by an insurance company as evidence of insurance; 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 41-32a-303.2 
(II) a certificate of insurance issued under Section 41-12a-402; 
(III) a certified copy of a surety bond issued under Section 41-12a-405; 
(IV) a certificate of the state treasurer issued under Section 41-12a-406; 
(v) a certificate of self-funded coverage issued under Section 41-12a-407; or 
(vi) information that the vehicle or driver is insured from the Uninsured 
Motorist Identification Database Program created under Title 41, Chapter 12a, 
Part 8. 
(c) Evidence of owner's or operator's security from the Uninsured Motorist 
Identification Database Program described under Subsection (2)(b)(vi) supercedes 
any evidence of owner's or operator's security described under Subsection 
(2) (b) (i) (D) or (E) . 
(3) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that the person 
had owner's or operator's security in effect for the vehicle the person was 
operating at the time of the person's citation or arrest. 
(4)(a) Evidence of owner's or operator's security as defined under Subsection 
(2)(b) except Subsections (2)(b)(l)(D) and (E) or a written statement from an 
insurance producer or company verifying that the person had the required motor 
vehicle insurance coverage on the date specified is considered proof of owner's or 
operator's security for purposes of Subsection (3) and Section 41-12a-804. 
(b) The court considering a citation issued under this section shall allow the 
evidence or a written statement under Subsection (4)(a) and a copy of the 
citation to be faxed or mailed to the clerk of the court to satisfy Subsection 
(3) . 
(c) The notice under Section 41-12a-804 shall specify that the written statement 
under Subsection (4)(a) and a copy of the notice shall be faxed or mailed to the 
designated agent to satisfy the proof of owner's or operator's security required 
under Section 41-12a-804. 
(5) A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor, and the fine shall be 
not less than: 
(a) $400 for a first offense; and 
(b) $1,000 for a second and subsequent offense within three years of a previous 
conviction or bail forfeiture. 
(6) Upon receiving notification from a court of a conviction for a violation of 
this section, the department: 
(a) shall suspend the person's driver license; and 
(b) may not renew the person's driver license or issue a driver license to the 
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person until the person gives the department proof of owner's or operator's 
security. 
(I) This proof of owner's or operator's security shall be given by any of the 
ways required under Section 41-12a-401. 
(II) This proof of owner's or operator's security shall be maintained with the 
department for a three-year period. 
( m ) An insurer that provides a certificate of insurance as provided under 
Section 41-12a-402 or 41-12a-403 may not terminate the insurance policy unless 
notice of termination is filed with the department no later than ten days after 
termination as required under Section 41-12a-404. 
(IV) If a person who has canceled the certificate of insurance applies for a 
license within three years from the date proof of owner's or operator's 
security was originally required, the department shall refuse the application 
unless the person reestablishes proof of owner's or operator's security and 
maintains the proof for the remainder of the three-year period. 
Laws 1993, c. 202, § 3; Laws 1994, c. 59, § 5; Laws 1994, c. 220, § 1; Laws 
1996, c. 33, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 200, § 1, eff. April 29, 
1996; Laws 1998, c. 35, § 4, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 216, § 2, eff. July 
1, 1999; Laws 2000, c. 345, § 6, eff. July 1, 2000; Laws 2003, c. 298, § 125, 
eff. May 5, 2003. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102. 
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq. 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301. 
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4- 302. 
Motor vehicle division, authority regarding licenses, see § 41-la-110. 
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204. 
Vehicle accidents, see § 41-6a-403. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Automobiles €=>324. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 48Ak324. 
C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 1311 to 1313, 1315 to 1317, 1455, 1526 to 1527, 1543 
to 1544. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-12a-303.2, UT ST § 41-12a-303.2 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Vfetlaw 
UT ST § 53-3-227 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 53-3-227 
West!s Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 53. Public Safety Code 
*! Chapter 3. Uniform Driver License Act 
*! Part 2. Driver Licensing Act 
-+§ 53-3-227. Driving a motor vehicle prohibited while driving privilege 
denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked—Penalties 
(1) A person whose driving privilege has been denied, suspended, disqualified, or 
revoked under this chapter or under the laws of the state in which the person's 
driving privilege was granted and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways 
of this state while that driving privilege is denied, suspended, disqualified, or 
revoked shall be punished as provided in this section. 
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1), other than a violation 
specified in Subsection (3), is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
(3)(a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if the person's conviction 
under Subsection (1) is based on the person driving a motor vehicle while the 
person's driving privilege is suspended, disqualified, or revoked for: 
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical test under Section 41-6a-520; 
(ii) a violation of Section 41-6a-502; 
(iii) a violation of a local ordinance that complies with the requirements of 
Section 41-6a-510; 
(iv) a violation of Section 41-6a-517; 
(v) a violation of Section 76-5-207; 
(vi) a criminal action that the person plead guilty to as a result of a plea 
bargain after having been originally charged with violating one or more of the 
sections or ordinances under this Subsection (3); 
(vii) a revocation or suspension which has been extended under Subsection 53-3-
220(2); 
(viii) where disqualification is the result of driving a commercial motor 
vehicle while the person's CDL is disqualified, suspended, canceled, or revoked 
under Subsection 53-3-414(1)/ or 
(ix) a violation of Section 41-6a-530. 
(b) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if the person's conviction under 
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Subsection (1) is based on the person driving a motor vehicle while the person1s 
driving privilege is suspended, disqualified, or revoked by any state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States for 
violations corresponding to the violations listed in Subsections (3)(a)(i) 
through (viii). 
(c) A fine imposed under this Subsection (3) shall be at least the maximum fine 
for a class C misdemeanor under Section 76-3-301. 
Laws 1933, c. 45, § 29; Laws 1983, c. 99, § 8; Laws 1983, c. 183, § 27; Laws 
1987, c. 137, § 36; Laws 1989, c. 209, § 20; Laws 1989, c. 252, § 7; Laws 1990, 
c. 30, § 8; Laws 1991, c. 241, § 60; Laws 1992, c. 80, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 234, § 
106; Laws 1994, c. 180, § 6; Laws 1996, c. 47, § 3, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 
2004, c. 205, § 6, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 2, § 262, eff. Feb. 2, 2005; 
Laws 2005, c. 91, § 10, eff. July 1, 2005; Laws 2005, c. 220, § 2, eff. July 1, 
2005; Laws 2007, c. 261, § 10, eff. April 30, 2007. 
Codifications C. 1943, § 57-4-32; C. 1953, §§ 41-2-28, 41-2-136. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of 
Laws 2005, c. 2, § 262, Laws 2005, c. 91, § 10 and Laws 2005, c. 220, § 2. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102. 
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq. 
Driving under the influence and reckless driving, revocation hearing for 
refusal, see § 41-6a-521. 
Driving while intoxicated and reckless driving, prosecution by municipal 
attorneys, see § 41-6a-519. 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 7 6-3-301. 
Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drugs, see § 41-6a-520. 
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4- 302. 
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Automobiles €^32 6. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 48Ak326. 
C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 1422 to 1432, 1524 to 1527, 1541, 1544. 
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